Antoine Arnauld: Intentionalität, Repräsentation und Phänomenologie (Intentionality, Representation and Phenomenology in Arnauld’s Philosophy) (with Stephan Schmid)

In: D. Perler & J. Haag (eds.), Ideen.  Repräsentionalismus in der frühen Neuzeit, vol. 2. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010, 232-251.

In this paper, we argue that as for Brentano, for Arnauld, intentionality is the mark of the mental. We then ask how, according to Arnauld, the intentionality of mental states is constituted, and, furthermore, how he can account for their intentional properties within the framework of his theory of ideas. The paper addresses these questions in three steps. In order to provide the necessary context for understanding Arnauld’s views, we begin by sketching Malebranche’s account of the intentionality of mental states. Against this backdrop, we then reconstruct Arnauld’s theory of ideas as he developed it in opposition to Malebranche. Finally, we show that Arnauld grounds the intentionality of mental states in their representationality, which he regards as explanatorily basic.